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MINNESOTA V MILLE LACS BAD OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS:
SHOULD THE COURTS INTERPRET TREATY LAW TO
EMPOWER TRADITIONAL NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES
TO HATCHET THE ENVIRONMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
As increasing globalization brings countries and cultures closer
together, treaty law will play a major role in the protection of the
environment and the preservation of natural resources.' In the re-
cent decision of Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians2 the
United States Supreme Court confronted the impact treaties, which
bind the United States, impart on individual states' ability to regu-
late their own natural resources. 3 The Court's analysis of federal-
ism and state police powers provides a useful tool for lower courts
to use in navigating the waters of American environmental policy in
the next century.
In Mille Lacs, the Court concluded that Native American treaty
rights granted by the federal government in the mid-1800s can co-
exist with state conservation laws.4 The Court faced two issues in
reaching this decision. 5 First, should the Tribe retain the hunting
and fishing rights granted under an 1842 treaty?6 This question
presents itself within the larger framework of whether a state has
the power to preempt rights retained through a federal treaty. 7
This Note begins its analysis, in Part 1I, with a discussion of the
federal government's enumerated power to settle treaties with Na-
1. See David A. Wirth, Globalizing the Environment, 22 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. &
POL'Y. REV. 353, 353 (1998) (stating that as United States and world begin to move
into twenty-first century, environment and environmental policy is caught in con-
ception of globalization); see also Mad Nakamichi, Note, The International Court of
Justice Decision Regarding the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J.
337, 363-64 (1998) (stating International Court ofJustice faced difficult task in bal-
ancing rights of parties under treaty law against ever-growing need to protect
environment).
2. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 172 (holding that although states have important interests in regu-
lating environment within their borders, authority is shared with federal govern-
ment when it exercises enumerated power).
5. See id. (determining problem to be resolved with two level inquiry).
6. See id. (deciding Chippewa retained their rights despite infringement on
Minnesota's sovereignty).
7. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 172 (reviewing conflict between duality of state
and federal power and concept of federal preemption).
(461)
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tive American Tribes.8 The background continues with an outline
of the decisional law related to the interpretation and control of
rights originating in Indian9 treaties, and the relationship of those
rights to the power of the states to regulate their own resources.10
Section III presents the facts of Mille Lacs," followed by the Su-
preme Court's analysis in section IV.12 Part V exhibits the flaws in
the logic of the argument and the misguided policy behind the de-
cision. 13 Finally, Section VI concludes with the decision's impact
on environmental preservation.1 4
II. BACKGROUND
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States
grants the President the power to make treaties with the consent of
two thirds of the Senate.' 5 Moreover, once the Senate approves the
treaty, it becomes part of the "supreme Law of the Land". 16 As a
result, once a treaty endorsed by the Senate preserves defined
rights, even the President lacks the power to revoke those rights
unless authorized by a congressional act or the Constitution. 17
While viewing Mille Lacs through this scope, it remains crucial
to note that treaties between the Native Americans and the United
8. For a discussion of the federal governments enumerated power to settle
treaties, see infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. This Note is intended to be
a specific study on treaties made between the United States government and the
American Indians. A great deal of the binding law in this forum, however, can also
be applied to any international environmental issue involving treaty law.
9. Where possible, the term Tribe will be used because it refers to the govern-
mental unit of the Native American populations. However, after extensive re-
search and toil, the term Indian was used in some places because there appeared
no fitting alternative language. The term Indian is used in a generic sense, and is
not intended to show any disrespect to the Native American people or culture.
10. For a discussion of case law involving international treaties and environ-
mental law, see infra notes 21-73 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the facts of Mille Lacs, see infra notes 74-111 and ac-
companying text.
12. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of Mille Lacs see infra notes 112-56
and accompanying text.
13. For a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's decision, see infra notes 157-
207 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the impact of the Court's decision, see infta notes 208-
15 and accompanying text.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2 (delegating to Executive Branch power to
make treaties); see also infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
16. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI states that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land." Id.
17. SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952)
(holding President's issuance of Executive Order to take over steel mills to prevent
labor strike during Korean War unconstitutional).
2
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States in the 1800s commonly preserved the hunting and fishing
rights of the Tribes. 8 These rights did not result from a govern-
ment grant, but instead reflected the reservation of rights held
before the cession of land.1 9 Negotiators, realizing the importance
of hunting and fishing to Native American cultures, recognized the
diminished prospects of settling any treaty with a Tribe without this
concession.20
The idea that a treaty with the Indians, as with any treaty, binds
the federal government was recognized in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,21 where the United States Supreme Court confirmed
that once rights have been preserved in a treaty endorsed by the
Senate, barring a federal statute or a constitutional provision to the
contrary, even the President lacks the power to retract the granted
rights. 22 Conversely, where the attempt to revoke previously
granted treaty rights is part of an order encompassing a larger ob-
jective, an exception exists which allows the court to evaluate intent
18. See Tracy A. Diekemper, Comment, Abrogating Treaty Rights Under the Dion
Test: Upholding Traditional Notions that Indian Treaties Are the Supreme Law of the Land,
10J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 473, 473 (1995) (identifying significant role hunting and
fishing played in Native American culture and necessity of conceding these rights
to settle treaties).
19. See id. (addressing that these "reserved" fights were not newly granted to
Indians, but were rights already held as current occupant of the land).
20. See id. (determining that reservation of hunting and fishing rights was es-
sential to any Indian treaty).
21. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
22. See id. at 588. In Youngstown, the Court declared as invalid the President's
Executive Order to the Secretary of Commerce to take control of the nation's steel
mills during the Korean War. See id. at 588-89. The Court rejected the argument
that the Constitution authorized this action; therefore, the Court declared the Ex-
ecutive branch's approach invalid. See id. The President, as "Commander-in-
Chief, took control of the steel mills because he feared the effects an impending
strike in the steel industry might have on the war effort in Korea." Id. at 583. The
action was unsuccessfully defended on three grounds. See id. at 585-89. First, the
Court rejected the idea that this fell within the Takings Clause with little considera-
tion. See id. at 587. Next, because it stretched presidential power too far, the Court
denied that the action could be justified under the auspices of the "Commander-
in-Chief" power. See id. at 587-88. Lastly, the use of the "Take Care" Clause to
"faithfully execute the laws" was dismissed in order to prevent future Presidents
from completely bypassing Congress. See id. This subsequently blocked a thought-
ful and thorough consideration of the new law. See id.
Although Youngstown fails to address treaty law specifically, it addresses the
larger issue of Executive power present in Mille Lacs. See id. at 579. Moreover,
when the Constitution specifically delegates power to a specific branch of the gov-
ernment, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court can decide the issue under
Article III. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 189 (1962) (stating that Founding Fa-
thers delegated specific powers to specific branches to achieve structural separa-
tion of powers). Consequently, prior to the application of Youngstown, the issue of
justiciability must be decided in Mille Lacs.
20001
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and determine severability. 23 The traditional test used to review in-
tent is: "[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently
of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as a law." 24 Thus, if a valid portion of an Executive
Order to remove the tribe was meant to stand in spite of the illegal-
ity of the remainder of the order, it stands alone as enforceable. 25
In the seminal case regarding Indian treaty rights, Washington
v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,26 the
Court held that treaties are to be interpreted liberally in favor of
the Tribe.2 7 The issue in Washington State Commercial centered on
the nature of the Indians' rights to capture fish under the treaty.28
The negotiator for the United States was very aware of the Tribe's
desire to retain their fishing rights; consequently, in exchange for
monetary compensation, fishing rights in traditional areas contin-
ued and the Tribe ceded land to the government.29 Moreover, in
interpreting the treaty, the Supreme Court decided that the United
23. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) (holding that inquiry
into whether constitutional provision is severable from rest of statute requires in-
quiry into legislative intent). The Mile Lacs Court adopted this standard from the
approach used in Regan to evaluate severability in statutory construction. See Mille
Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999). The Court took this approach because no prece-
dent existed dealing specifically with the severability of Executive Orders. See id.
24. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 1198 (citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) (stating that valid portion of statute
can stand upon showing that legislature would have passed it independent of inva-
lid portion had it held knowledge of its invalidity); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (holding that proper inquiry is whether legislature
would have enacted valid portion of statute despite knowing other part was inva-
lid); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at 653 (determining that Court is to analyze
legislative intent to determine if valid portion of law was intended to stand alone).
25. See Mille Lacs 526 U.S. at 191 (recognizing that it had never determined
severability of Executive Orders, the Supreme Court, decided to apply standard
used to determine severability of congressional statutes).
26. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
27. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979) (holding that inherent unequal bargaining
power necessitates interpretation favoring Indians); see also Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (stating that treaties with Native Americans
are to be construed in sense Indians understood them, while recognizing it is obli-
gation of United States to protect interests of dependent people).
28. See Washington State Commercial, 443 U.S. at 661 (recognizing importance
fish played in Native American economy and culture).
29. See id. Documentation made it clear that the negotiators of the treaty rec-
ognized the importance of fishing rights to the Tribe and their concern was that
the non-Indian settlers might seek to monopolize the fisheries and preclude Native
Americans from using them. See id. at 666-67 (highlighting that treaty was explicit
in addressing Tribe's important interest in preserving fishing rights). The Court
further noted that the Tribe relied heavily on the good faith promise of the negoti-
ators to protect that right. See id. As a result, the Washington State Commercial Court
4
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States, as the superior power in the negotiations, had the responsi-
bility to avoid taking advantage of the Tribe.30 As a result, the
Court protected the Tribe as the inferior negotiators by interpret-
ing the treaty as the Tribe would have, and not necessarily accord-
ing to the meaning of the technical terms in the language of the
agreement.3'
In the similar case of Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v.
Klamath Indian Tribe,32 the Court reinforced the premise expressed
in Washington State Commercial that treaties with the Native Ameri-
cans are to be interpreted as the Tribe would have interpreted
them.33 But, the Supreme Court also indicated that it would look
beyond the written words of a treaty to a larger context that encom-
passed the history of the treaty, the negotiation process, and the
practical construction of the treaty.34 In Klamath, the Tribe ceded a
found it unlikely that either party intended the agreement to crowd the Native
Americans out of their accustomed fishing grounds by white settlers. See id.
30. See id. at 676 (determining that United States, as superior power in negoti-
ations, has responsibility to avoid taking advantage of other side); see also
Diekemper, supra note 18, at 474 (stating that courts acknowledge unequal bar-
gaining power and develop rules of construction to level inequity between Native
Americans and United States).
31. See Washington State Commercial, 443 U.S. at 678 (holding Tribe's interpre-
tation dictates treaty's meaning); see also Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
576-77 (1908). In Winters, an 1888 treaty created the Fort Belknap reservation. See
id. at 576. The land reserved to the Indians was particularly arid, and the treaty
failed to refer to the rights to dam at the Milk River, or use it for irrigation. See id.
at 577. The Court ruled that the Tribe would not have understood the agreement
to have deprived them of access to the river for irrigation purposes. See id. The
river was necessary to maintain their way of life. See id.
32. 473 U.S. 753 (1985).
33. See Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473
U.S. 753, 774 (1985) (citing Washington State Commercial 443 U.S. at 675-76). For a
full discussion of Washington State Commercial, see supra notes 26-31 and 62-70 and
accompanying text; see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905)
(holding courts should construe treaties with Native Americans as Tribes under-
stood them, and as justice and reason demand).
Moreover, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), held that any ambiguities in a treaty between the
federal government and the Indians are to be settled in favor of the Native Ameri-
cans. See id. This result stems from the paternalistic concept that the United States
has a responsibility to protect the Native Americans given the relationship the
treaty establishes between the two. See Brian Richard Ott, Comment, Indian Fishing
Rights in the Pacific Northwest: The Need for Federal Intervention, 14 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L.
REv. 313, 319 (1987) (analogizing relationship to one between ward and guardian
resulting in fiduciary duty of the government to the Indians, as well as, a duty of
loyalty).
34. See Klamath, 473 U.S. at 774 (requiring analysis of intent to interpret trea-
ties); see also El A] Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999)
(providing that treaty ratified by United States is not only law of land, but also
agreement among sovereign nations which traditionally needs aids of interpreta-
tive aids such as negotiating and drafting history and post-ratification understand-
20001
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large portion of land to the United States, but maintained a reserva-
tion of land for themselves.3 5 The Tribe also reserved exclusive
hunting and fishing rights on the reservation.3 6 In a later agree-
ment in 1901, the Klamath Tribe ceded additional land to the
United States.3 7 The Tribe unsuccessfully argued that the lack of
just compensation for the hunting and fishing rights indicated their
failure to relinquish those rights in the 1901 agreement.38 After
reviewing the history and the negotiation records to determine the
Tribe's intent, the Court determined that the 1901 agreement ter-
minated the "exclusive" hunting and fishing rights held by the
Tribe.3 9
In the most recent significant decision regarding abrogation of
Native American Treaty rights, United States v. Dion40 , the Court
stated that Congress may terminate Indian treaty rights, but it must
clearly express its intention to do so for the action to take effect.41
In Dion, Congress had passed a law that prohibited the hunting of
bald or golden eagles, and the defendant, a Native American, had
been caught hunting in violation of the statute. 42 The Supreme
ing). See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331, art. 26, 27, 29 (describing tools to interpret
treaties).
35. See Klamath, 473 U.S. at 755. A major portion of the dispute resulted from
a number of erroneous surveys done on the reservation land. See id. The Klamath
Tribe complained many times of the inaccuracy of the survey. See id. at 756. This
was a major dispute in Klamath, because the action was for just compensation on
the land surveyed incorrectly. See id. In actuality, the government was sued for
compensation on the land it took as a result of the incorrect survey. See id.
36. See id. at 755. The 1864 Treaty ceded "'all their right, title, and claim to
all the country claimed by them,'" while reserving 1.9 million acres for a reserva-
tion. Id. (citing the Treaty of October 14, 1864 (ratified by the Senate on July 2,
1866, and announced by President Grant on February 17, 1870)).
37. See id. at 761 (continuing the acquisition of lands owned and occupied by
Chippewa).
38. See id. at 771. The Court determined that an end to the hunting and
fishing rights, if the Klamath were compensated, is not inconsistent with the 1864
Treaty protecting the Tribe's hunting and fishing rights. See id. The payment
could be considered as an attempt to remedy the erroneous surveys performed in
assessing the original reservation boundaries. See id.
39. See id. at 774 (following precedent of Washington State Commercial and El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd).
40. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
41. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738, 740 (1986) (holding express
intent is necessary for Congress to abrogate treaty rights); see also Washington State
Commercial, 443 U.S. at 690 (stating that absent explicit statutory language, Court
will be extremely reluctant to abrogate treaty rights); Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (declining to allow backhanded abrogation of
Native American hunting and fishing rights).
42. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 736. The Bald Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Protection
Act) made it a federal crime to hunt bald eagles unless authorized to do so by a
6
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Court upheld the Native American defendant's conviction because
the treaty rights previously granted had been abrogated by subse-
quent congressional acts. 43 Using legislative history and pre-treaty
debate, the Court determined that the government met its burden
of proof by showing Congress's awareness and subsequent con-
scious abrogation of the right.44
Much earlier, the Court validated Congress's express intent to
revoke Indian treaty rights through its decision in Ward v. Race
Horse.45 The decision in Race Horse relied on the "equal footing"
doctrine.46 This egalitarian policy provides that all states shall enter
the Union maintaining the same level of sovereignty as the original
thirteen states. 47 Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that Wyo-
ming's entrance into the Union extinguished any rights created
permit issued by the Secretary of the Interior. See id. The right to hunt and fish on
the land was reserved by the Tribe in an 1858 Treaty, and there were no restric-
tions placed on the hunting rights. See id. Later, Congress passed the Eagle Pro-
tection Act, and it was judged to have overruled the treaty rights of the Indians
because Congress had exercised its constitutional powers. See id. at 740.
43. See id. (overruling court of appeals decision to dismiss conviction based on
treaty rights).
44. See id. The Supreme Court evaluated the Eagle Protection Act and deter-
mined the Act, on its face, sufficiently abrogated the hunting rights under the
treaty. See id. The legislative history confirms this view, particularly Congress's de-
cision to amend the Act to include the golden eagle and the insertion of the per-
mit requirement indicate Congress's clear intention to legally deprive the Native
Americans of their rights under the treaty. See id. The permit attributed to the
amended statute allowed for the issuance of permission to hunt the birds for relig-
ious reasons and other very narrow purposes. See id. The creation of this power in
the statute reflects a realization that the rights granted under the treaty had been
revoked, but the Indians needed an exception for cases of extreme circumstances.
See id. For a discussion of the facts that indicate intent to abrogate the Indians
treaty rights, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
45. See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896) (holding that power of
state to control and regulate taking of game cannot be questioned). The Supreme
Court stated that repeals by implication are not favored, and they will not be up-
held if there is any other method available on which to judge the case. See id. In
this case, the Court evaluated whether Wyoming's Enabling Act revoked the hunt-
ing rights reserved under the applicable treaty. See id. at 514. The Court deter-
mined that the two provisions of the Enabling Act admitting Wyoming to the
Union could not be seen as coexisting with the Native Americans' treaty rights. See
id. Thus, the Native Americans' treaty rights had been repealed by Congress. See
id.
46. See id. at 511. The Act admitting Wyoming to the Union expressly gave
Wyoming all the powers granted to the other states of the Union, which includes
the ability to regulate game within the state. See id. No reservation of rights was
made to the Tribe. See id. To allow the rights of the Indians to stand would tread
on the power granted to the state of Wyoming to regulate its own environment. See
id.
47. See id. (holding that Union is one of states, equal in power, dignity, and
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under treaties between the United States and the Native American
Tribes because the treaty rights infringed on Wyoming's
sovereignty. 48
By contrast however, the Court infringed on state sovereignty
in Missouri v. Holland,49 when it held that although states have im-
portant regulatory interests over natural resources and the environ-
ment, the federal government necessarily trumps this authority in
specific circumstances.5 0 In Holland, the federal government en-
tered into a treaty with Great Britain, then in control of the Cana-
dian government, to prohibit the hunting of designated migratory
birds in North America.51 In conjunction with that treaty, Congress
passed a federal statute regulating the killing of these same birds.5 2
The Court rejected the Tenth Amendment challenge to the federal
law based on two fundamental findings: (1) the environmental
problem was one beyond the competence of the states, and (2) the
claim was based on an improper claim of title to the birds.53 The
Court concluded that the states create many laws under the Tenth
Amendment merely because the federal government fails to ad-
dress the issue; but, in this case the federal government legislated in
48. See id. (basing its holding on Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), which
involved similar fact pattern). In allowing the State of Oklahoma to move its capi-
tol in defiance of the state Enabling Act, the Court stated:
The plain deduction from this case is that when a new State is admitted
into the Union, it is so admitted with all the powers of sovereignty and
jurisdiction which pertain to the original States, and that such powers
may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any
conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which the
new State came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if
the subject of congressional legislation after admission.
Coyle 221 U.S. at 574 (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845)).
49. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
50. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). Reliance on the Tenth
Amendment was not enough due to the express authority granted to the President
under Article II, § 2 of the Constitution. See id. The power to make treaties is
strengthened by the Supremacy Clause. See id. The Holland Court held that if the
treaty was valid, the federal statute was also valid under the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I, § 8. See id.
51. See id. at 431 (determining enough concern existed to deal with problem
on international stage).
52. See id. at 431 (utilizing Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate enumer-
ated power to make treaties).
53. See id. at 433. The State argued that imposing federal law in this area
violated its rights to determine gaming and conservation laws within its own bor-
ders. Brief for Appellant at 4, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (No. 609). The
Court held that the migration of the birds across many states expanded the juris-
diction of the case out of the reach of one individual state. See id. It then declared
that since the birds were wild, no state could legitimately claim title to them. See id.
8
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the pertinent area, and its law remains supreme. 54 However, the
federal government can share the authority to legislate with the
state government when the national government uses an enumer-
ated power. 55 As a result of the federal government's decision to
legislate in this area, the Court ruled that the treaty was the su-
preme law of the land under Article VI, and Congress could pass
the accompanying legislation under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 56
The Court then departed from the principles outlined in the
Holland analysis in deciding Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of
Washington.5 7 In Puyallup, a Washington state law prohibiting fish-
ing conflicted with an 1854 treaty with the Puyallup Tribe.58 The
Supreme Court ruled that Washington, for conservation purposes,
54. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 (holding that national interest "of very nearly
the first magnitude is involved.").
55. See id. at 420 (naming treaties as one of three federal laws that serve as
"supreme Law of the Land"); see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543
(1976) (upholding premise that Supremacy Clause dictates law when federal gov-
ernment exercises enumerated power to settle treaty); United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 383 (1905) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (maintaining
federal government could create rights binding on states as long as state is part of
United States)); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 198
(1876) (purporting that federal law applies equally to all states and is beneficial to
Minnesota); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 416 (1968) (holding
that, despite transfer of statutory control to state of Wisconsin, federal treaties with
Menominee Tribe remained in force).
The enumerated power exercised by the federal government is the power to
make treaties. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Once the treaty is ratified by the
Senate, it passes into law. See id. As part of federal law, it becomes the "supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
56. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 431 (deciding that it was proper to interpret treaty
by taking in whole of national experience). Since the treaty does not violate any
part of the Constitution, and it involves an issue of national interest, the Tenth
Amendment cannot defeat the resulting statute. See id.
The Necessary and Proper Clause appears in Article I of the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, par. 18. It authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary to
achieve the enumerated powers vested in the federal government by the Constitu-
tion. See BLACK's LAw DI rIoNARY 1029 (6th ed. 1990). However, it is also curious
that the Court did not use the Commerce Clause in some way since the birds regu-
larly migrate from one state to another and one country to another. See id.; see
generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; compare Holland with Houston E. & W. Texas RY.
Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (holding that Congress may exercise
power to prevent common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commerce
from being used in intrastate operation to injure interstate commerce).
57. 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
58. See Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392,
393 (1968). The state game law prohibited the fishing of steelhead and salmon for
commercial purposes, and fishing with certain net types. See id. The Puyallup Indi-
ans challenged the state law as infringing on their fight to hunt and fish in their
traditional manner. See id. An 1854 Treaty had provided for "the right of taking
fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, in common with all citizens
of the Territory." Id.
2000] MiLLE LACS 469
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had the power to regulate the manner in which fish were caught if
the law was reasonable and necessary, and if it did not discriminate
against the Indians.59 In making this decision, the Court deemed
the regulation of fishing methods a valid exercise of the state's po-
lice power.60 The combination of these two propositions allowed
state regulations to preserve the environment and resources while
simultaneously maintaining federal treaty rights.6 1
Washington State Commercial and Antoine v. Washington62 re-
present the Court's furtherance of the Puyallup decision and its eva-
sion of the Race Horse line of "equal footing" doctrine cases. 63 The
Washington Supreme Court, in Antoine, upheld a conviction under
the state game law prohibiting the hunting and possession of deer
during closed season, despite federally granted treaty rights to un-
limited hunting for Native Americans. 64 In reviewing the state
court decision, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the
59. See id. at 398 (holding treaty as infringing on state's police power).
60. See id. The Court decided that the treaty language allowing Indians to fish
in the "usual and accustomed places" gave the Indians the right to fish in places
they traditionally fished under the treaty. See id. at 398. However, the treaty failed
to discuss the fishing methods used in the designated areas. See id. As such, the
state could regulate the Indians' methods. See id.
The Court further stated that because the treaty maintained these rights in
conjunction with those held "in common with all citizens of the Territory," the
treaty puts the Indians on equal footing with other citizens in the state of Washing-
ton. See id.
61. See id. The Court often links state police power with the Tenth Amend-
ment argument made in National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
In National League, the Court declared an extension of the Fair Labor Standards
Act as unconstitutional because it violated states' autonomy to regulate issues di-
rectly affecting local government. See id. (deciding that states needed ability to
self-regulate in areas such as fire prevention, police protection, and public health).
The Court would likely view environmental concerns the same way. See id.
62. 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
63. Compare Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 755 (1979) (providing that states do not have power to
overcome Supremacy Clause and enforce state environmental regulations), and
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201 (1974) (holding that state qualification
of rights provided under treaty is precluded by the Supremacy Clause) with Mille
Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 188 (1999) (claiming federal and state law can co-exist allowing
state environmental regulations to be enforced). Both Washington State Commercial
and Antoine seem to indicate that when the new state enters the Union, it is not
entitled to overrule federal treaties with the Native Americans in order to enforce
environmental laws. See Washington State Commercial 443 U.S. at 755; Antoine, 420
U.S. at 201.
64. See Antoine, 420 U.S. at 195-96. The Indians defended their actions by
citing the congressional ratification of the treaty between the Indians and the fed-
eral government as the superseding authority. See id. at 196. Article 6 of that treaty
stated in pertinent part that "the right to hunt and fish in common with all other
persons on lands allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or anywise
abridged." Id.
10
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Supremacy Clause primarily as a means to preempt the state law
with federal treaty rights. 65 The Court, however, recognized a legit-
imate exception to the Supremacy Clause. 66 Upon review, the
Court concluded that although a state may not "qualify" federally
granted rights, it may impose regulations that effect those rights if
there is a legitimate interest in conservation. 67 The Antoine Court
determined the government demonstrated no legitimate interest in
conservation, and it accordingly reversed the conviction under the
state gaming law. 68 In much the same way, the Washington State
Commercial Court refused to enforce a state game law.69 These two
decisions reflect the Court's failure to fully address the conflict be-
tween Indian treaty rights and a state's sovereignty over its own nat-
ural resources and land use. 70
The Mille Lacs decision exhibits the opposing thrusts of these
varied established legal principles. The power to make treaties,
supported by the Supremacy Clause, legitimates the Mille Lacs
Tribe's reliance on the hunting and fishing rights retained in the
treaty.71 Simultaneously, however, the state of Minnesota also holds
a strong position that the President legitimately rescinded the treaty
rights under the power of revocation granted by Congress, and, in
the alternative, by the "equal footing" doctrine.72 These conflicting
65. See id. at 201 (rejecting Washington Supreme Court's opinion that agree-
ment was mere contract). The Antoine Court conceded that Congress cannot con-
stitutionally inhibit state police power by legislatively endorsing a contract between
the Executive Branch and the Indians. See id. The Washington Supreme Court,
however, failed to recognize the agreement at issue was a treaty, and therefore, it
failed to become part of the "supreme Law" of the land under Article VI of the
federal Constitution. See id.
66. See id. (citing Puyallup) For a full discussion of the holding in Puyallup see
supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
67. See Antoine, 420 U.S. at 201 (requiring state showing that regulation is rea-
sonable, necessary, and nondiscriminatory as conservation measure and applica-
tion to Native Americans is necessary for conservation).
68. See id. (reversing conviction under state gaming law).
69. See Washington State Commercial 443 U.S. at 682 (citing Puyallup standard
for allowing imposition of state game laws over treaty rights). For a discussion of
Puyallup, see supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
70. See Antoine, 420 U.S. at 196; see also Washington State Commercia 443 U.S. at
682. For a discussion of the precedent set by Puyallup and relied upon by the
Antoine and Washington State Commercial Courts, see supra notes 57-61 and accompa-
nying text.
71. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 215 (1999) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
72. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 215 (stating 1837 Treaty provided sufficient
power to revoke usufructuary rights, and Race Horse also allowed revocation based
on "equal footing" doctrine).
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principles result in the complicated maze presented by the collision
of international law and American domestic law in Mille Lacs.73
III. FACTS
In 1837, the United States government summoned members of
the band of Chippewa Indians to a point near present-day St. Paul,
Minnesota to negotiate a treaty that would cede Chippewa land to
the American government.7 4 The Chippewa agreed to sell the land
on the condition that their hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
were protected within the ceded lands. 75 The treaty, signed on July
29, 1837, guaranteed these rights. 7 6 Article V of the 1837 Treaty
stated: "The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild
rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the terri-
tory ceded, is guarantied [sic] to the Indians during the pleasure of
the President of the United States." 77
Many of the same bands of the Chippewa Nation of Indians
entered into a second treaty in 1842, which mirrored the previous
agreement of 1837.78 The federal government again took title to a
portion of Chippewa land, and again the Tribe reserved their usu-
fructuary rights to the land.79 Contrary to the 1837 Treaty, how-
ever, this treaty contained a provision that held the Tribe subject to
removal from the area ceded at the discretion of the President of
the United States.8 0
As time passed, white settlers became increasingly discontented
with the presence of the natives in the newly acquired areas, and
73. See id. (reviewing and analyzing various aspects of international and con-
stitutional law in order to resolve dispute with American Indian Tribe).
74. See id. at 176 (stating that United States representative told assembled In-
dians that United States wanted to purchase Chippewa lands east of Mississippi
River, in present day Wisconsin and Minnesota).
75. See id. (retaining hunting and fishing rights, not receiving them).
76. See id. (noting that in first two articles of treaty, Indians were divested of
their lands in return for twenty annual payments of money and goods).
77. Id. (citing 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa, 7 Stat. 537).
78. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 177. This treaty again provided for yearly annu-
ity payments, and reserved the Indians usufructuary rights on the land. See id.
Usufructuary, a term used generally in this Note, refers to hunting and fishing
rights; however, the term has a much broader conceptual basis. See id. Correctly
defined, the term means "a real right of limited duration on the property of an-
other." See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1990).
79. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 176-77 (showing reservation of hunting and fish-
ing rights as recurring theme in treaties between Indians and federal
government).
80. See id. The exact phrase resembled Article V of the 1837 Treaty in that it
subjected the Indians to removal "at the pleasure of the President of the United
States." Id.
12
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they pressured the territorial government to ask the President of
the United States to remove the Chippewa. 81 In September of
1849, Minnesota Territorial Governor Alexander Ramsey lobbied
the Territorial Legislature to request that President Zachary Taylor
remove the Chippewa from the land.8 2 The Legislature complied
by sending a resolution to Congress to have the tribe removed in
order to "ensure the security and tranquility of the white settle-
ments ... ."83 That request eventually made its way to President
Taylor, and he responded by issuing an Executive Order on Febru-
ary 6, 1850.84 Taylor's order intended to revoke the rights given to
the Chippewa under the treaties of 1837 and 1842, and it called for
81. See id. (citing App. 878 (Report and Direct Testimony of Dr. Bruce M.
White) as acknowledging white settlers' unhappiness with different tribe of
Indians).
82. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 176. The Territorial Governor claimed the
Chippewa needed to be removed because the white settlers in the Sauk Rapids and
Swan River area were complaining about the privileges granted to the Indians. See
id. at 178.
83. Id. at 178 (citing App. to Pet. For Cert. 567). The territorial legislature
curiously petitioned Congress instead of the President, but the Court was unable to
determine the reason for this puzzling choice. See id. The text of the resolution
read:
[T]o ensure the security and tranquility of the white settlements in an
extensive and valuable district of this Territory, the Chippewa Indians
should be removed from all lands within the Territory to which the In-
dian Title has been extinguished, and that privileges given to them by
Article Fifth [of the 1837 Treaty] and Article Second [of the 1842 Treaty]
be revoked.
Id.
The reasoning behind the requested removal was the aforementioned claim
asserted by the white settlers in the Sauk Rapids and Swan River area that the
Indians should not be entitled to the reserved hunting and fishing rights. See id.
(noting that, in contrast, evidence suggests that white settlers were actually com-
plaining about Winnebago Indians). Additional evidence suggests that Min-
nesotans wanted more Native Americans relocated from Michigan and Wisconsin
to Minnesota because the Native American population brought the economic ben-
efits of trade. See id.
84. See id. The order provided:
The privileges granted temporarily to the Chippewa Indians of the Missis-
sippi, by the Fifth Article of the Treaty made with them on the 29th of
July 1837, 'of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the
lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded' by that
treaty to the United States; and the right granted to the Chippewa Indi-
ans of the Mississippi and Lake Superior, by the Second Article of the
Treaty with them of October 4th 1842, of hunting on the territory which
they ceded by that treaty, 'with the other usual privileges of occupancy
until required to remove by the President of the United States,' are
hereby revoked; and all of the said Indians remaining on the lands ceded
as aforesaid, are required to remove to their unceded lands.
Id. (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. 565).
20001
13
Quinter: Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians: Should the Cour
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
474 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XI: p. 461
their removal from the ceded territory.8 5 Moreover, it remains
clear that the officials implementing this order understood it as a
removal order first and foremost.86
The government hoped to encourage peaceful relocation of
the Chippewa to the unceded lands in Minnesota by changing the
disbursement location of annuity payments on the land.8 7 This
plan resulted in disaster the first time it was implemented, and,
thus, intensified the opposition to the removal of the Chippewa
within both the Indian and non-Indian communities of the area.88
In response to this opposition, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
lobbied the federal government to modify the President's removal
order to allow the Chippewa to stay in the area they held under the
treaties.89 The Commissioner determined that the Chippewa
presented no danger to the government of the United States or its
objectives. 90 Moreover, the Commissioner believed the move would
be highly detrimental to the Chippewa.91 In the end, the federal
government abandoned its attempt to remove the tribe by changing
85. See Mile Lacs, 526 U.S. at 178-95. Due to the Mile Lacs Court's decision,
though, Taylor's order revoked the rights in theory only. See id. The interpreta-
tion rendered by the Court retrospectively made the order ineffective, practically
speaking. See id. Seen, however, in a historical context, the removal order was put
into effect in a very real sense. See id. For a discussion of the impact of the order,
see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
86. See Mile Lacs, 526 U.S. at 179. As evidence of this point, the state offered a
letter from Secretary of the Interior Brown to Governor Ramsey, dated Feb. 6,
1850. See id. The substance of this letter, and several others offered as evidence,
was not discussed. See id. ( assuming that letters supported argument that all those
enforcing President Taylor's order interpreted it as removal order).
87. See id. The new place of payment would be at Sandy Lake, Minnesota, a
place outside the ceded land. See id. (discussing that previous point for disburse-
ment would no longer be used).
88. See id. at 180. The Chippewa were told to be in Sandy Lake by October 25,
1850. See id. Approximately 4,000 Indians had assembled there by November 10,
but the payments were not completely disbursed until December 2, 1850. See id.
During that time, 150 Chippewa died of measles and dysentery, and an additional
230 Chippewa died on the winter trek back to Wisconsin. See id. The State
presented evidence that citizens of Michigan and Wisconsin voiced their objec-
tions to the President's removal order because of this tragedy. See id.
89. See id. (identifying Commissioner's concern for health and welfare of
Chippewa).
90. See Mile Lacs, 526 U.S. at 180-81. Commissioner Lea stated that "removal
of the Wisconsin Bands 'is not required by the interests of the citizens or Govern-
ment of the United States and would in its consequences in all probability be disas-
trous to the Indians.'" Id. (quoting letter from Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Luke Lea to Secretary of the Interior Stuart).
91. See id. (pointing out that Commissioner of Indian Affairs' concern for
Chippewa, prompted him to request that removal be suspended until President
had opportunity to reconsider his position).
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the site of issuance for their annuity payments back to the original
location.92
The government's choice to discontinue the removal policy
did not, however, stop it from attempting to acquire more Chip-
pewa land. 93 In 1854, the House of Representatives passed legisla-
tion to authorize additional treaties with the Chippewa for the
purchase of more land.94 Taking a different approach, the House
decided to move away from the removal policy, and instead pushed
for the creation of reservations on ceded lands.95 Although the
Senate did not pass the bill, the Commissioner on Indian Affairs
began implementing it by directing the negotiation of another
treaty with the Chippewa. 96
Congress's stated objective for the 1854 Treaty was to acquire
the remaining Chippewa lands in Wisconsin and the Minnesota
Territory.97 Several Chippewa Bands signed the treaty, but the
Mille Lacs band, curiously, was not a party to the agreement.98 Sub-
sequently, the Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish Tribes
ceded additional lands to the United States in an 1855 treaty.99
92. See id. at 180. Governor Ramsey continued his attempts to entice the
Chippewa into relocation on unceded lands. See id. Ramsey's continued efforts
were terminated in 1853, when President Franklin Pierce came into office. See id.
As a result, the point of disbursement of the annuity payments was moved back
inside the ceded territory. See id. (noting that at that point, indications were that
change in distribution points originally was only incidental to attempt to remove
Chippewa, and not attempt to revoke reserved hunting and fishing rights).
93. See id. In fact, the federal government seemed to understand that the
Indians' hunting and fishing rights under the 1837 Treaty were still valid. See id.
Proof exists in an incident in 1849, when a group of white lumbermen built a dam
on the Rum River that interfered with the Chippewa's wild rice harvest. See id.
The Tribe protested, and violence broke out in 1855. See id. Upon calling for
federal troops to resolve the situation, the Governor of Minnesota commented to
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Mannypenny that the land belonged to the United
States, with the exception of the hunting and fishing rights reserved. See id.
94. See id. (discussing House of Representatives debated bill that provided for
extinguishment of title in lands owned by the Chippewa of Wisconsin and
Minnesota).
95. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 183 (describing that this approach still provided
for extinguishment of Indian title in the land).
96. See id. (explaining that treaty was actually negotiated, although it did not
include Mille Lacs Band, which ceded additional land to United States). The 1854
Treaty also reserved certain lands for a reservation, and hunting and fishing rights
in the ceded territory. See id. at 184.
97. See id. at 184 (highlighting that Minnesota's territorial delegate to Con-
gress suggested to Commissioner Mannypenny that treaty be settled with Missis-
sippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish Bands of Chippewa).
98. See id. (noting that almost every previous signatory signed treaty except
Mille Lacs band).
99. See id. (making no specific mention of usufructuary rights). The first two
sentences of the 1855 Treaty are:
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That agreement provided for full and complete relinquishment of
any right, title, or interest then held in the lands of the Territory of
Minnesota or elsewhere.100
In 1858, the United States admitted Minnesota to the
Union. 10 1 The Minnesota Enabling Act states: "' [T]he State of Min-
nesota shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United
States of America, and admitted into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States in all respects whatever."' 102 The Enabling
Act does not address Native American treaty rights.10 3
The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians filed suit in the Fed-
eral District Court for the District of Minnesota in 1990 to enforce
their rights under the 1837 Treaty.104 In a two-part trial, the Chip-
pewa sought: (1) a declaratory judgment stating that they retained
The Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish bands of Chippewa
Indians hereby cede, sell, and convey to the United States all their right,
tide, and interest in, and to, the lands now owned and claimed by them,
in the Territory of Minnesota, and included within the following boun-
dries, viz [describing territorial boundaries]. And the said Indians do
further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any
and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be,
which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory of
Minnesota or elsewhere.
Id.
Article 2 set aside lands for the reservations of the signatory tribes. See id.
(pointing out, however, that neither treaty nor records of the negotiations discuss
hunting and fishing rights).
100. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185 (noting that Mille Lacs Band is not men-
tioned as party to this agreement). As a general principle of international law, no
nation can be bound by a treaty to which it is not a party. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 26,
27, 29. Thus, the status of an Indian Tribe, as an international entity, must be
determined. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185. The use of a treaty at the time of the
agreement implies that the United States considered the Chippewa Indian Tribe a
foreign power, with which only Congress held the power to deal. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to govern relations with Indians through
Commerce clause).
101. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185 (noting that Minnesota became state on
May 11, 1858).
102. See id. at 203 (citing Minnesota Enabling Act of May 11, 1858, 11 Stat.
285).
103. See id. (noting absence of language regarding treaty rights).
104. See id. at 185. Conversely, the State had concerns that the Chippewa's
unchecked access to hunting and fishing on public land would harm the state
economy and environment. See Facts on File World News Digest, Apr. 8, 1999.
The State also had concerns about "[t] he wealthiest people in our country" using
the Chippewa, and that a verdict for the Tribe would put them outside the reach
of state natural resources agencies. See Dennis Anderson, Indian Fishing Case is Now
in Supreme Court's Hands, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Dec. 3, 1998, at 1C
(speculating wealthy businessmen may attempt to circumnavigate conservation
laws by encouraging Chippewa to take more from environment to sell to busi-
nesses with restricted intakes).
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their hunting and fishing rights, and (2) an injunction preventing
state interference with those rights.1 5 The district court deter-
mined that the Mille Lacs band retained the rights they reserved
under the 1837 Treaty, and rejected the validity of the Executive
Order of 1850 removing the Chippewa from their reserved land. 10 6
Prior to the adoption of a Conservation Code and Manage-
ment Plan in the second phase of the trial, the district court al-
lowed several Wisconsin Bands of Chippewa to join as plaintiffs.107
At this juncture, the defendants unsuccessfully introduced the argu-
ment that Minnesota's admission to the Union required abrogation
of the Chippewa's treaty rights by Congress through the "equal
footing" doctrine. 08 Accordingly, the district court granted the in-
junction and began formulating the Conservation Code. 10 9
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment relevant to the 1850 Executive Order,
the 1855 Treaty, and the "equal footing" doctrine.1 0 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, in turn, affirmed the
decision of the lower courts."'
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Three issues confronted the Supreme Court when it consid-
ered Mille Lacs.1" 2 First, the Court addressed Minnesota's claim
that President Taylor's Executive Order revoked the Chippewa's
usufructuary rights and effectively negated the Tribe's protection
105. See Mille Lacs 526 U.S. at 185. The United States entered the trial as a
plaintiff, and six private landowners and nine counties joined as defendants. See
id. The case was bifurcated by the court into two phases: (1) retention of treaty
rights, and (2) state regulation. See id. (referencing that later district court also
added similar case involving Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa for consolidation
purposes).
106. See id. According to the District Court, the invalidity of the 1850 Execu-
tive Order indirectly shows that the abrogation of hunting and fishing rights was
not achieved. See id.
107. See id. at 186 (discussing that in addition to joinder of parties, district
court allowed State to add argument that Minnesota Enabling Act erased Indians'
hunting and fishing rights).
108. See id. (rejecting Minnesota's argument that to enter on equal footing
required ability to override treaty with Mille Lacs Band).
109. See id. at 187 (holding state regulation of Indian hunting and fishing can
coexist with federal treaty law).
110. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 187 (determining that because district court's
decision on maintenance of usufructuary rights was upheld, injunction was
maintained).
111. See id. at 202 (finding for Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and
granting injunction of state law).
112. See id. at 188, 195, 201 (outlining three arguments made by Minnesota).
2000]
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under the 1837 Treaty.' 13 Second, the Court determined the valid-
ity of Minnesota's claim that the Treaty of 1855 revoked all the
rights the Chippewa still held in the land. 14 Finally, the Court de-
cided whether the "equal footing" doctrine annulled the Chip-
pewa's rights when Minnesota joined the Union. 15
A. The Executive Order
The Supreme Court dealt with President Taylor's Executive
Order by relying on the same principle the Eighth Circuit used
when deciding the case: "'[t]he President's power, if any, to issue
the order must stem from Congress or from the Constitution.' 11116
Minnesota cited the Removal Act as the basis for the President's
power to revoke treaty rights.117 The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, stating that the Act neither authorized nor forbade the
issuing of the order. 118 Minnesota argued in the alternative that if
the Removal Order was invalid, the provision providing for revoca-
tion of usufructuary rights was severable. 119 The Court dismissed
Minnesota's argument by reasoning that Congress would not have
enacted the provision to revoke usufructuary rights independent of
the removal order.1 20
113. See id. at 188. Minnesota argued that the Executive Order removing the
Mille Lacs Band was authorized under the second treaty in 1855. See id. at 196
(setting forth Minnesota's belief that since order called for removal of Chippewa
from Minnesota territory, and revoked their usufructuary rights, Chippewa could
no longer claim exemption from conservation laws of Minnesota).
114. See Mile Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200-01. For a discussion of the decision on the
Executive Order, see infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
115. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 184. For a discussion of the decision on the
1855 Treaty see infra notes 124-48 and accompanying text.
116. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 187. For a discussion of the decision on the
Minnesota Enabling Act, see infta notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
117. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 189. After being petitioned by the people of
Minnesota in 1850, Congress passed the Removal Act. See id. (recognizing that
legislation granted President power to exchange lands occupied by Indians for
land west of Mississippi).
118. See id. (looking to other sources to determine if the Executive Order was
legitimate because Court found no explicit language granting power to President
to revoke in Removal Act). They reviewed the Treaty of 1837, and found nojustifi-
cation for the order. See id. at 1198. The Court deemed that the silence in the
treaty indicates that Congress did not intend to delegate the power to revoke the
right to anyone. See id. The Court relied on evidence that the United States
signed several treaties with similar provisions around the same time as the 1837
agreement, and some of those did include removal clauses. See id. Thus, the si-
lence on the issue here indicates a conscious choice to not grant the power to
revoke the rights. See id.
119. See id. at 191 (arguing severance allows revocation to stand without
removal).
120. See id. (basing analysis on its decision in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpo-
ration Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). The Champlin Court stated
[Vol. XI: p. 461
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B. The 1855 Treaty
The Supreme Court resolved the second issue by rejecting the
state's contention that the 1855 Treaty revoked Chippewa hunting
and fishing rights. 121 Article V of the Treaty revoked all rights
"whatsoever" held by the Tribes in the lands of Minnesota. 122 Min-
nesota claimed that this language unambiguously relinquished the
Native American's rights to hunt and fish. 123 As a logical extension
of this claim, the state further maintained that this language was a
clear abrogation by Congress of treaty rights held under the 1837
Treaty. 124 The Supreme Court disagreed.1 25
The Court based its conclusion on the theory that since the
1855 Treaty failed to mention the hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights reserved in the 1837 Treaty, those rights remained intact af-
ter the 1855 agreement. 126 The 1855 Treaty also did not mention
any money to be paid as consideration for the abrogation of previ-
ously retained treaty rights. 127 The Supreme Court assumed the in-
telligence of the drafters of the treaty, and decided that if the
the test as: "[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the inva-
lid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Champlin, 286
U.S. at 234. The Mille Lacs Court applied this same test of severability to the Presi-
dent's Removal Order. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 191 (asking whether President
would have revoked treaty privileges if he could not order removal and that, if not,
President Taylor intended for the decision to "stand or fall as a whole"). The
Court saw no evidence supporting that Taylor's order should stand in the light
Minnesota presented it. See id.
121. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 201 (deciding 1855 Treaty insufficiently ad-
dressed fights granted in 1837 Treaty).
122. See id. at 195. Article I of the treaty stated: "And the said Indians do
further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any and all
right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, which they may
now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere."
Id.
123. See id. at 195 (relying on meaning of Article I on its face).
124. See id. (applying Article I to immediate case).
125. See id. at 201 (holding 1855 Treaty did not revoke usufructuary rights
granted under 1837 Treaty because did not explicitly mention those rights).
126. See Mile Lacs, 526 U.S. at 195. The Court stated that because the rights
were reserved in the 1837 Treaty, they would have to be explicitly mentioned and
relinquished in the 1855 Treaty to show Congressional intent to abrogate those
rights. See id. Again, the Supreme Court, decided that the negotiators could have
explicitly included this in the treaty, but instead the negotiators chose not to dis-
cuss it. See id. As such, the court perceived that it was purposely left out to main-
tain the previously granted rights. See id. (adding that Indians could not have
understood 1855 Treaty to abrogate previously reserved rights unless it was explic-
itly stated in document).
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drafters intended to abrogate the rights granted by the Treaty of
1837, then they would have done so explicitly. 128
Because the 1855 Treaty failed to mention or disqualify the
rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty, the Court evaluated the 1855
Treaty by examining the larger context that framed the treaty,
namely the intent. 129 In so doing, the Supreme Court reviewed the
history of the treaty, its negotiation process, and the practical con-
struction adopted by the parties. 130 Following the precedent of
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, the Court investigated how the Chippewa Indians understood
the treaty.13' Viewing the evidence in this light, the Court deter-
mined that the congressional records from the relevant period, the
negotiations with the Chippewa in settling the Treaty, and a similar
treaty signed in 1854 by different Tribes, showed that Congress had
no intent to eliminate usufructuary rights, and the Tribe would not
have understood the treaty to accomplish that objective. 132 In fact,
the negotiations made no mention of the relinquishment of hunt-
ing and fishing rights. 133
128. See id. The Court continued arguing that, in fact, some months later, the
government negotiated similar treaties in which the abrogation of usufructuary
rights was clear and unambiguous. See id. at 199; see also Treaty with the Chippewa
of Sault Ste. Marie, Art. 1, 11 Stat. 631; Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,
631 (1970).
129. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 197-200 (reviewing history of treaty, negotia-
tions, and practical construction).
130. See id. at 196 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318
U.S. 423, 432 (1943)).
131. See id. (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)).
132. See id. at 200. The Act of December 19, 1854, was negotiated with the
Chippewa for the extinguishment of their title to all the lands owned by them in
the Territory of Minnesota and the State of Wisconsin. See id. at 197. The Act was
silent on the issue of revocation, so the Court interpreted that to mean Congress
intended to not revoke the hunting and fishing privileges. See id. In fact, the
Chairman on the Committee of Indian Affairs, Senator Sebastian, commented that
the Act would reserve to the Chippewa all the rights previously maintained under
separate treaties. See id.
A review of the negotiation process also revealed to the Court that the Indians
understood the treaty to cede additional land only. See id. at 197. The Court relied
heavily on a comment made by the Chief of the Pillager Band of Chippewa: "It
appears to me that I understand what you want, and your views from the few words
I have heard you speak. You want land." Id.
133. See id. at 198. The TreatyJournal, which stands as a record of the negoti-
ation of the treaty, is also silent with regard to usufructuary rights. See id. (sug-
gesting that there is no way Chippewa could have understood treaty to divest them
of their previously held rights and noting that it is hard to see why Chippewa would
so willingly give up rights they had fought so hard to maintain under Treaty of
1837).
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The Court also reviewed a memorandum submitted by Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs Mannypenny to the Senate while the
Senate debated the fate of the treaty.13 4 The Court evaluated the
memo and determined that the relevant language in Article I of the
treaty intended only to extinguish the remaining Chippewa claims
to tide in the land.13 5 Further analysis revealed to the Court that
the silence on usufructuary rights meant the treaty failed to revoke
those rights.1 3 6
Finally, the Mille Lacs Court historically juxtaposed the 1854
Treaty with the Chippewa with the 1855 Treaty to suggest an irregu-
larity.137 Close analysis showed that most of the bands of Chippewa
Indians party to the 1837 agreement also signed the 1854 Treaty.138
Rather than abrogating the usufructuary rights or establishing some
framework to do so in the 1854 Treaty, the government chose to
expressly secure new hunting and fishing rights for the signatory
bands. 139 Minnesota offered no compelling reason to explain why
the United States might want to re-establish all the other Chippewa
usufructuary rights while choosing to abrogate the Mille Lacs
band's rights. 140 As a result, the Supreme Court determined that
Congress did not intend to revoke the Tribe's usufructuary
rights.141
134. See id. at 198. As is the case with all treaties, to become binding on the
United States, the Constitution requires ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In this case, the treaty was submitted to the Senate
pursuant to that article, and the accompanying report was noted by the Court for
what it did not say as much as for what it did say.. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 198.
There was no mention of any attempt to revoke usufructuary rights, and the ratifi-
cation memo by Mannypenny stated that the Indians "have some right of interest
in a large extent of other lands in common with other Indians in Minnesota, and
which right or interest ... is also ceded to the United States." Id. at 198-99.
135. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 199 (maintaining that usufructuary rights re-
mained intact).
136. See id. (adding that other lands do not seem to be those referred to in
1837 Treaty).
137. See id. (comparing 1855 Treaty to 1854 Treaty to determine if 1855
Treaty was intentionally silent on revocation of usufructuary rights). For a full
discussion of the treaties see infra notes 121-45 and accompanying text.
138. See id. Curiously, the Mille Lacs Band is the only group that took part in
the 1837 agreement that subsequently failed to sign the Treaty of 1854. See id. The
State offered no evidence supporting why the government would revoke the hunt-
ing and fishing rights of the Mille Lacs Band in 1855, only one year after granting
several other bands of Chippewa usufructuary rights. See id.
139. See id. at 199 (recognizing that there was conflict in interpretation of
State's argument).
140. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200 (deciding conflict in approaches not
intended).
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The Court determined that, at best, the state proved that an
ambiguity existed as to Congress's intention to revoke the Mille
Lacs band's usufructuary rights. 142 In light of Washington State Com-
mercial, the Court liberally interpreted the treaty in favor of the
Chippewa by resolving the ambiguities in their favor.1 43 The Court
deemed the state's reliance on Oregon Dep't of Fish and Wildlife v.
Klamath Indian Tribe unfounded. 144 The Mille Lacs Court stated that
it examined the historical record and the context of the treaty ne-
gotiations to ascertain that the intent of the Treaty in Klamath was
to extinguish hunting and fishing rights. 145 This was not the case in
Mille Lacs.
C. The Equal Footing Doctrine
The Court resolved the final issue in Mille Lacs by rejecting the
State's argument that the "equal footing" doctrine terminated the
Chippewa's treaty rights when Minnesota entered the Union. 146
Minnesota relied heavily on the Race Horse verdict in arguing that in
142. See id. at 200 (positing that 1855 Treaty creates mere ambiguity in 1837
Treaty rights).
143. See id. (citing Washington State Commercial precedent to validate interpre-
tation of treaties in favor of Indians); see also Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (holding that Indians' interpretation of treaty
requires that allotments of common tribal lands to Choctaw freedmen were to be
made without deduction from lands held in common with Chickasaw Nation);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (stating that treaty is to be
understood as Indians interpret it because Indians are not aware of multiple infer-
ences of treaty); Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (invalidating tax on sale of land because it differed from
Indians' interpretation of treaty).
144. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 201-02 (distinguishing Klamath as relying on
connection between land ownership and usufructuary rights, while usufructuary
rights in Mille Lacs exist independent of land ownership).
145. See id. (pointing out that Klamath differed from this case in Court's eyes
because Chippewa's rights here existed independent of any land ownership
claims). The result of the Klamath treaty differed from this case in that the 1901
agreement relinquished the usufructuary rights reserved under the 1864 treaty.
See id. at 202. The Treaty of 1864 reserved the right to hunt and fish on the reser-
vation only. See id. Thus, when the 1901 agreement was signed, ceding all the land
on the reservation to the United States, those rights were extinguished. See id.
(noting that rights were exclusive to lands of reservation only).
146. See id. (stating that basis for this argument is constitutional); see also
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (discussing Court's reluctance to
find congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights without expressed indica-
tion). Minnesota argued that states have the ability to regulate their own natural
resources. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 203. Additionally, when Minnesota came into
the Union, it should have been entitled to enter the fold with the same rights held
by every other state. See id. at 204. However, the federal government violated this
doctrine by attempting to force Minnesota to recognize rights granted to the In-
dian tribes under the federal power to settle treaties with the Indians before Min-
nesota was a State. See id.
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss2/5
MILLE LACS
order for Minnesota to enter the Union on equal footing, it must
maintain the right to regulate its own natural resources. 47 The Su-
preme Court, however, inexplicably dismissed the precedent of
Race Horse.148 In so doing, the Court simply stated that Indian
treaty rights may co-exist with a State's ability to regulate and con-
serve its own natural resources. 149 The opinion continued by ac-
knowledging that this rule "curtailed" the state's ability to regulate
hunting and fishing, but the treaty-based grant of these same rights
did not guarantee Native Americans absolute freedom from state
regulation. 150
In sum, the Mille Lacs Court freely recognized that the rights
retained in the 1837 Treaty gave the Chippewa the privileges to
hunt and fish free of territorial and, later, state regulation.151 The
Chippewa maintained this privilege to the exclusion of everyone
else in the state. 152 Nevertheless, the Court refused to acknowledge
that Chippewa usufructuary rights based in the treaty were free
from all state regulations. 153 The Supreme Court reasserted long-
standing precedent that states may impose reasonable nondiscrimi-
natory regulations on Native American usufructuary rights in the
interest of conservation.1 5 4 In doing this, the Court protected both
147. See Milk Lacs, 526 U.S. at 204. Minnesota believed that in the Court's
failure to allow the state government to overcome the federal treaty, the Court was
violating fundamental aspects of Minnesota's state sovereignty. See id. (citing Coyle
v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911)).
148. See id. at 203 (suggesting that decision in Ward v.Race Horse relied on
false premise that Indians' treaty rights to hunt and fish on state land are irrecon-
cilable with state's sovereign ability to manage its own resources).
149. See id. Here the court relies heavily on the constitutional principle estab-
lished in Missouri v. Holland, which held that when the federal government is exer-
cising one of its enumerated powers, such as the making of treaties, the result of
the application of that power is the supreme law of the land. See Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). In such situa-
tions, state authority is shared with the federal government. See Mille Lars, 526 U.S.
at 204.
150. See Mille Lacs, at 204. Relying on Klamath, the Court imposed state envi-
ronmental regulations on federal treaty fights. See id. at 205. For a discussion of
Klamath, see supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
151. See id. at 204 (confirming existence of hunting and fishing rights granted
in 1837 Treaty).
152. See id. (reviewing language of 1837 Treaty).
153. See id. at 204-05 (citing Klamath, 476 U.S. at 765 n.16).
154. See id. at 205 (citing decision in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game
of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) applying conservation necessity standard); see
also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443
U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979) (allowing state regulation of hunting rights granted under
treaty in interest of environment); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201
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the rights of the Chippewa and the State. 55 As a result, the Court
concluded that statehood, in and of itself, cannot terminate the
Mille Lacs Band's treaty rights. 156
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Mille Lacs suffers from three
major deficiencies. First, the Court based its conclusion on several
inconsistent assumptions. 15 7 Second, the decision violates several
principles of constitutional law. 158 Third, the opinion disregards
several valid policy considerations.159
A. Logical Leaps
To begin, the opinion of the Court makes several "logical
leaps."1 60 Repeatedly, the Court interpreted the silence of a treaty,
in conjunction with an assumption of the intelligence of the negoti-
ators, to mean that the treaty's failure to address usufructuary rights
meant the negotiators intentionally disregarded the issue. 161 This
is not necessarily a prudent assumption. The evidence provides no
indication of the sophistication level of the negotiators; addition-
ally, no document indicates that the negotiators did not believe that
the signed document abrogated the previously granted rights. 162
Another logical leap is the conclusion that the 1850 Executive
Order was indivisible because President Taylor intended it to "stand
155. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 205 (stating that Indians retained usufructuary
rights, and state maintained its ability to regulate natural resources).
156. See id. (rejecting equal footing doctrine argument).
157. For a discussion of the Court's unfounded conclusions, see infra notes
163-74 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the constitutional violations, see infra notes 175-200
and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of the policy consideration, see infra notes 201-06 and
accompanying text.
160. The term logical leap is used to denote a bypassing of several steps in the
logical progression. See BLACK's LAW DICriONARY 1020 (6th ed. 1990).
161. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 199 (comparing 1855 Treaty to other treaties
which explicitly mention usufructuary rights).
162. See id. at 217-18 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). In fact, as the state of Minne-
sota suggests, in the case of the 1855 Treaty, the language itself suggests that the
negotiators considered the relinquishment of the rights reserved in the 1837
Treaty and considered them abrogated by the broad provision of the 1855 Treaty.
See id. at 218. Additionally, the United States negotiators in 1855 probably believed
the 1850 Executive Order legitimately terminated the usufructuary rights granted
in the 1837 Treaty. See id. For a discussion of the negotiators' beliefs while settling
the 1855 Treaty, see supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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or fall as a whole." 16 3 The historical facts used to demonstrate this
position lack reliability.16 4 Further, the majority incorrectly based
its opinion predominantly on second-hand evidence. 1 65 The opin-
ion begins with the fact that those charged with enforcing the or-
der interpreted it as a removal order rather than a revocation of
hunting and fishing rights. 1 6 6 The Court also construed the lan-
guage of the order to indicate removal as the primary objective. 167
However, the structure of the language leads to a contrary conclu-
sion, specifically, that the primary objective was to revoke hunting
and fishing rights, and removal was a means to that end.' 68
The Court's reliance on historical evidence also proved troub-
lesome in proving intent, given the nature of the evidence.1 69 To
start, the Mille Lacs Court correctly determined that treaties with
the Native Americans are to be construed in the manner in which
the Indians would have construed them. 170 This notion, however,
163. See id. at 190 (providing insufficient evidence to support non-severance
of Executive Order).
164. For a discussion on the unreliability of the historical facts, see infra notes
165-74.
165. See id. at 190 n.4 (discussing numerous cases where Court determined
Tribes' intent by relying incorrectly on interpretations of Indian intent by federal
negotiators).
166. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 178. Relying on the second-hand account
skews the Indians' true interpretation of the treaty by relying on an observer's
mere perception of the Indians. See Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues,
76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 425 (1992) (referring generally to Anglo-American system's
heightened scrutiny about second-hand evidence). In the end, this evidence can
be likened to hearsay evidence because it is offered solely for the truth of the
matter asserted. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801; McGoldrick v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, 428 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71, 73 (1968) (defining hearsay); Mutyambizi v.
State, 363 A.2d 511, 518 (1976) (discussing hearsay rule); BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY
722 (6th ed. 1990) (defining hearsay and discussing briefly federal rules on hear-
say). The problem with hearsay evidence, as with any second-hand evidence, lies
in its reliability. See Damaska, supra note 166, at 425. In fact, the evidence relied on
by the Court to determine the Chippewa's intent could be considered hearsay be-
cause it merely represents the American negotiators' beliefs as to the Chippewa's
interpretation of the document. See generally FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining any out of
court statement offered as evidence of truth of matter asserted as hearsay).
167. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 178 (identifying primary objective of order as
removal).
168. See id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The use of the term "all" in the
1855 Treaty is an all-encompassing term. See id. Moreover, the precise dictionary
definition of the term "usufructuary" explains why the 1855 Treaty is devoid of
explicit language dealing with hunting and fishing rights. See id. Usufructuary
rights are "real rights of limited duration on the property of another." See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1990).
169. See Mill Lacs, 526 U.S. at 214 (explaining "curiosity" of opinion that 1837
Treaty fails to permit removal).
170. See id. (agreeing, in dissent, with majority in decision to interpret the
1855 Treaty as Indians would).
2000] 485
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presents a practical difficulty because it requires the Court to "get
into the head" of the Tribe.1 71 Secondly, the Court erred by at-
tempting to discern the Tribe's interpretation of the treaty from
second-hand accounts.1 72 The records kept by the United States
government during the negotiation process illustrate only the
American negotiators' perceptions of the Native American's inter-
pretation of the treaty.' 73 To rely on this evidence begs the ques-
tion of whether the Indians' intentions and understanding of the
process are determinable given that none of the Tribal representa-
tives present at the negotiations recorded their experiences, and
they permanently remain unavailable for consultation. 174
B. Constitutional Conflicts
The Mille Lacs decision also presents constitutional
problems. 75 The first issue originates in the Supremacy Clause of
171. See id. at 1195. The Treaty does not explicitly mention removal because
its purpose was the transfer of land. See id. After the exchange of land for goods
and money, the Chippewa only maintained the right to enter the ceded land to
hunt and fish. See id. When President Taylor revoked those rights via the 1850
Executive Order, the Chippewa had no remaining rights in the ceded territory. See
id.
172. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196 (representing American negotiators' be-
liefs as to Indians' interpretation of treaty).
173. See id. The small bit of evidence given by the Court that speaks to the
understanding of the Mille Lacs Chippewa is irrelevant in this case because it is the
American negotiators' perceptions of the Indians understanding of the treaty. See
id. at 214. For a detailed discussion of the dangers of accepting second-hand evi-
dence, see infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
The Court quoted the Chief of the Pillager Band as saying: "It appears to me
that I understand what you want, and your views from the few words I have heard
you speak. You want Land." Id. at 197. While this may theoretically illustrate the
Court's point that the Indians understood the contract to be about sale of land
and not the abrogation of treaty rights, it does not discount the idea that the Indi-
ans may not have expected to relinquish their hunting and fishing rights simulta-
neously. See id. In addition, since this attempt came from the Chief of the Pillager
Band, it does not necessarily reflect the interpretation of the proceedings in the
Mille Lacs Band. See id.
174. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling the his-
torical evidence ambiguous); see also Washington v Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979) (requiring that treaties be
interpreted as Indians saw them); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201 (1974)
(affirming notion that interpretation of treaty is not to be construed in favor of
Indians' prejudice).
175. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (refering primarily
to problems with federalism resulting from decision). Justice Rehnquist listed con-
stitutional problems commonly connected with separation of powers. See id. at 211
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist also addressed issues centering on federal-
ism. See id.
26
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the Constitution. 176 The Mille Lacs Court correctly stated that once
the Senate ratifies a treaty, it is considered part of the supreme law
of the land, and that treaty cannot be revoked except by an act of
Congress or a constitutional provision. 177 Although the Removal
Act of 1830 failed to provide for the expulsion of the Chippewa, the
Treaty of 1837, as ratified by Congress, allowed the President to
remove the Chippewa from the ceded lands.1 78 Thus, President
Taylor's 1850 Executive Order for removal was valid and effectively
erased the Chippewa's hunting and fishing rights. 179 Furthermore,
176. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relying on
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952), for proposition
that Constitution or federal law must grant President power to revoke legal rights).
Moreover, treaties constitute law to the same degree as statutes under the Constitu-
tion. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (delegating Executive Branch power to make
treaties); U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2 (making all treaties the "supreme Law of the
Land").
177. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 211 (citing Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 680 (1981)); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating ratified treaties are su-
preme law of land).
178. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Also playing in
to this analysis is the fact that treaty language is to be interpreted at face value.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31. The language of the Treaty states that the right to hunt and
fish is to be given at the "pleasure of the President of the United States." See Mille
Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This implies that the President
has the power to revoke the rights granted by the 1837 Treaty because the lan-
guage of the treaty indicates a sufficient exercise of delegated authority to uphold
the 1850 Executive Order. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. Thus, the Court's at-
tempt to investigate the intent of the treaty exceeds the proper standard, and sub-
sequenly violates the rules of interpretation and validates President Taylor's
Executive Order of 1850. See id.; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31. However, this
concept will not be discussed in this Note.
179. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 1208 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The rule
states: " The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
The Court's decision in Dames and Moore also established treaty law as a source of
law able to authorize an Executive Order. See Dames and Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
Where the President acts on implied congressional consent, the action is to be
shown great deference. See id. In this case, it rises to a higher level because con-
sent is explicitly issued by the 1837 Treaty. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
To this end, the Removal Act of 1830 seemed to authorize the President to
revoke rights and remove the Chippewa to the West. See id. at 189. The Act only
authorized the President to convey lands to the Tribes that chose to relocate. See
id. The Chippewa did not agree to relocate. See id. Thus, the President's 1850
Removal Order was invalid under the 1830 Removal Act. See id. The Court then
dismissed the severability argument made by Minnesota. See id. Relying on the
principle that legislative intent determines severability, the Court correctly decided
that the removal of the Indians was the sole task of the 1850 order. See id. Since
the President did not intend for the revocation of usufructuary rights to stand
alone if the removal order fell, the usufructuary rights had to remain intact. See
id.; see also Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S.
2000]
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the language of the Supremacy Clause seemingly contradicts the
Court's assumption that the Tribe's treaty rights and state conserva-
tion laws can peacefully co-exist.180
The Court also mistakenly sidestepped the constitutional issue
of federalism in its analysis.181 Although the Court recognized that
enforcement of the treaty infringed on Minnesota's police power, it
failed to address the bigger hurdle produced by the Tenth Amend-
ment.182 The Constitution does not explicitly allocate to the fed-
eral government the power to regulate the environment, thus, that
power is left to the states via the Tenth Amendment.183 Allowing
Congress to infringe on Minnesota's power to control the use of its
own natural resources and preserve its own environment creates se-
rious implications for federalism by moving away from the common
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. 184
210, 234 (1932) (stating that "unless it is evident that the legislature would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as
law."); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (holding that proper
inquiry is whether legislature would have enacted valid portion of statute despite
knowing other part was invalid); Dames and Moore, 453 U.S. at 653 (determining
that Court is to analyze legislative intent to determine if valid portion of law was
intended to stand alone).
The Court comments that the United States treaty drafters had the sophistica-
tion and experience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights. See
Mile Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This same sophistication,
adjudged by the majority to have resulted in a belief that a simple clause revoking
all "interests" in the land, would suffice to revoke usufructuary rights. See id.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause mandates that the federal
law be supreme. See id. Therefore, any co-existence of the federally granted hunt-
ing and fishing rights in treaty law and state conservation laws is inconsistent with
the Supremacy Clause by definition and purpose. See id.
181. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that any
limitations that Treaty of 1837 imposes on state's self-regulation of natural re-
sources imposes "serious federalism costs"). Justice Thomas also opined that the
Court could resolve the issue of extinguishment without discussing federalism. See
id.
182. See id. at 204 (stating state power is shared with federal government when
federal government exercising enumerated power); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X
(leaving all powers not enumerated to federal government to states).
183. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X (withholding federal power to pass environ-
mental regulations by granting all powers not enumerated to federal government
in Constitution to state government); see also National League of Cities v. Usury,
426 U.S. 833 (1976) (declaring extension of federal law as unconstitutional be-
cause violated state autonomy to regulate issues directly affecting local issues).
184. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
prudently distinguished two scenarios. See id. at 222 (differentiating between on-
reservation rights and off-reservation rights) Rights applicable on an Indian reser-
vation are untouchable by state government. See id. Off-reservation rights are sub-
ject to state regulation for environmental reasons. See id. The threshold is very
high, however, and it depends greatly on the language and subsequent reach of
the treaty. See id. As an example, Justice Thomas stated that a "privilege" granted
28
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As the Tenth Amendment instructs, environmental conserva-
tion policies on gaming remain better placed in the states'
hands.1 8 5 The illogical assumption of a peaceful co-existence be-
tween federal treaty law and state conservation laws results in two
basic problems for the 1837 Treaty: (1) the Constitution does not
explicitly provide the federal government with the power to enact
environmental laws;' 8 6 and (2) the Chippewa are no longer a "for-
eign power."1 8 7 First, although the Constitution allots Congress the
ability to create binding treaties, which become the supreme law of
the land, it fails to allot Congress the power to dictate environmen-
tal laws and standards to the states.188 The Court incorrectly
strayed from the principle asserted in Ward v. Race Horse that treaty
rights conflicting with a state's ability to regulate its own natural
resources impairs a state's sovereignty as a whole.' 8 9 Furthermore,
an analysis of the federal government's intent in signing these trea-
ties reveals that the purpose of the treaties was not to protect the
environment; rather, the United States government wished to gain
possession of the land in order to extract natural resources for its
to hunt and fish is reachable by state regulation. See id. Conversely, a "right" is
immune from state regulation. See id. (noting difference is merely one of
semantics).
185. See U.S. CONST. am. X (allocating all power not granted to federal gov-
ernment to states).
186. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (making treaties supreme law of land,
thus contradicting idea of co-existence of state and federal law in conflict).
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (delegating power to Congress to handle
all relations with Indians, power which lost potency when Native American Tribes
no longer existed as separate "international" governmental units practically
speaking).
188. See supra notes 186-87. The Court incorrectly assumed the co-existence
of state conservation laws and federal treaty law because despite the Supremacy
Clause, Congress cannot pass unconstitutional laws. See id. The silence of the Con-
stitution on environmental concerns indicates that the power was left to the states
via the Tenth Amendment. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 199 (utilizing same logic
Court used to interpret 1855 Treaty). As such, if the part of the treaty dealing with
hunting and fishing rights seems valid, then the argument for severability becomes
moot. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. Of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392, 398
(1968) (holding that to enforce treaty infringes on state police power); Ward v.
Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 507 (1896) (stating that Indians' right to hunt on lands
may be found to extent that problems do not arise).
189. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
that case at hand differs from Race Horse). In actuality, the Court has indirectly
overruled Race Horse. See id. at 221. The Court incorrectly differentiated Race Horse
from Mille Lacs. See id. Race Horse held "'temporary and precarious'" rights cannot
survive admission into the Union. See id. at 1212. The facts in Mille Lacs fulfill this
test, not the permanent ;rights that the Court decided should survive statehood.
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own use. 190 Adding insult to injury, the states' environments re-
main highly vulnerable because the Court has deprived states of the
right to fully regulate them while the Court has simultaneously ne-
glected to protect those environments itself.1 91
Constitutionally, Mille Lacs presents several separation of pow-
ers issues as well. 192 To begin, the justiciability of this dispute may
be questionable. 193 This dispute could be placed in the realm of a
political question best left to the national legislature.194 As a result,
Mile Lacs may be a case that the Supreme Court cannot decide. 195
The main issue, however, is whether Congress may grant the
President the power to unilaterally overrule a law. 196 The Court
misapplied the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision by
dismissing the fact that Congress granted the President the power
to terminate the Tribe's usufructuary rights.197 The Court erred by
failing to recognize treaties as a legitimate source of law.198 In Mille
Lacs, the 1837 Treaty explicitly gave the President the power to re-
voke the Chippewa's usufructuary rights.1 99 As such, the President
190. See MilleLacs, 526 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing comment
earlier in case that Indians' right to be on land would not interfere with purpose of
purchasing land to acquire timber and other natural resources).
191. See id. In fact, by allowing the Chippewa to maintain their hunting and
fishing privileges, they have hurt the environment while helping themselves. For a
discussion of the potential of poaching, see infra notes 210-14 and accompanying
text.
192. See id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The chief separation of powers
problem centers on the authority to issue the Executive Order and hinges on the
Court's interpretation of Youngstown. See id. Additionally, it is disputable that the
case is justiciable because it involves a political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962).
193. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209 (providing that certain issues delegated to spe-
cific branch in federal government cannot be decided by Court).
194. See id. (raising questions about justiciability of case as political question).
Because the text of the Constitution explicitly allocates to Congress the power to
control all relations with the Indians, it could be argued that the Court cannot
decide this case as a constitutional matter. See id.
195. See id. (adjudging Court cannot resolve political questions).
196. See Mille Lacs, 119 U.S. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The treaty has
become federal law under Article VI of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
The question becomes whether the President, as the executor of laws, can be em-
powered with the ability to abrogate a law unilaterally. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 549 (1952). This plays into the general proposi-
tion that Congress cannot pass unconstitutional laws. See id.
197. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reinforcing that
treaty law is supreme law of land under Constitution).
198. See id. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Dames and Moore, 453 U.S.
at 680) (noting that "treaties, every bit as much as statutes, are sources of law and
may authorize executive actions").
199. See id. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The 1837 Treaty provided a
quid pro quo. See id. The phrase "at the pleasure of the President of the United
States" indicates that the maintenance of the Chippewa's usufructuary rights was
30
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held the power to revoke those rights because Congress consented
to it.200
C. Policy Considerations
Finally, the Court failed to recognize two policy considerations.
First, in declaring co-existence between federal treaty law and state
conservation laws, the Court assumed that the federal government
was aware of the environmental problems Minnesota faced. 20 1 This
assumption is very dangerous because Congress will likely be unable
to maintain a general awareness of environmental problems in
every state.202 Surely Congress possesses neither the time nor the
resources to deal with every individual problem throughout the
country.20 3 This power is more properly delegated to the state gov-
ernments. 20 4 The states are more aware of the local problems that
not permanent. See id. The treaty was an exchange of lands for money and goods.
See id.
The Court subsequently adopted the approach taken by Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion from Youngstown in its later cases. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-
41. Justice Jackson developed three categories to evaluate presidential authority in
Youngstown. See id. at 635. First, if the approval is express or implied, then the
action is Valid. See id. Second, if Congress withholds approval, explicitly or by im-
plication, then the President cannot act. See id. at 637. Lastly, a zone of overlap
exists that allows an inference of presidential power. See id. at 637. Dames and
Moore created a continuum of Justice Jackson's principles from Youngstown. See
Dames and Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.Justice Rehnquist correctly placed this case in the
category of an explicit grant of power to the President. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at
210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, the President has the power to revoke the
rights granted under the Treaty of 1837.
200. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relying on
Youngstown and Dames and Moore).
201. See id. at 203. This assumption may not be logical, given the physical
amount of territory the national government is required to regulate, and the size
of the United States. This is especially true when one considers the unique forms
environmental problems can take depending on the location in the country.
202. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. See id. (validating that Treaty law is supreme law of land); see also U.S.
CONsT. art VI., cl. 2. (discussing objective of Supremacy Clause was to create uni-
form system of government that had evaded Articles of Confederation); Theodore
J. Lowi & Benjamin Ginsburg, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM AND POWER, 32
(4th ed., W.W. Norton & Co., 1996) (noting that Articles of Confederation were
discarded simply because they gave states too much power, and national govern-
ment was unable to make any progress in development). Inherent in the purpose
of the Supremacy Clause is the prevention of a double standard that allows citizens
too much maneuverability. See id. The problem with this approach is that it can
deprive the state of the power it needs to solve problems that it is in the best
position to address. See generally National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (determining decisions affecting local government are best left to states to
decide).
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confront them, and they are more likely to efficiently deal with the
problems that directly affect them.20 5
Second, by advocating the co-existence of state environmental
regulations and usufructuary rights granted by a federal treaty, the
Court created a double standard that permits possible manipula-
tion of the system. 20 6 As a result of two laws governing the same
concern, but in different manners, Native Americans may play the
rules against each other.20 7 Inevitably, the possibility arises that Na-
tive Americans might choose to invoke federal treaty rights or state
environmental controls based on the convenience of which one
benefits them in their immediate situation.
VI. IMPACT
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Mille Lacs may
have grave implications on several levels. First, to allow the Chip-
pewa to maintain hunting and fishing on these lands may affect the
use of the land.208 If the Chippewa maintain a right that supersedes
the state conservation laws, which bind other citizens, it may dis-
suade others from developing the land for fear the Chippewa might
be a constant nuisance and destroy the property.20 9 This effectively
allows the Chippewa to dictate the use of the land.210
205. See id. (allowing states to deal with problems best allocated to them).
206. See Milk Lacs, 526 U.S. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (inferring that
conflict between state and federal law creates double standard).
207. See id. Conversely, the State had concerns that the Indians' unchecked
access to hunting and fishing on public land would harm the state economy and
environment. See Facts on File World News Digest, Apr. 8, 1999. This decision
creates a double standard that allows the Indians to play federal law and state law
against each other. See id. This lack of uniformity may result in the Chippewa
invoking state conservation laws when it benefits them, and, conversely, using the
treaty to protect themselves from the state when necessary. See id.
208. See Milk Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207. Maintaining the rights of the Indians to
enter the lands to hunt and fish will closely connect them with that land. See id. As
a result, people will be deterred from purchasing and developing the land for fear
the Indians, by constantly being present to hunt and fish, will devalue the property
or become a nuisance. See id. Even worse, if the Chippewa turn to poaching the
land, the land may become unusable to other members of society that may have
developed the land for productive purposes. See Dennis Anderson, Indian Fishing
Case is Now in Supreme Court's Hands, STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 3, 1998, at IC (implying
Chippewa poaching as potential disability in land development).
209. See Anderson, supra note 208, at Ic (fearing poaching and general nui-
sance due to presence).
210. See id. By creating this reluctance to develop the land, the Indians have,
in effect, control over the land. See id. In practical terms, this erases the treaty as if
it never existed. The Indians control the land as if they still own it.
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Secondly, this ruling frustrates the states' ability to conserve
natural resources through state legislation.211 Exempting the Na-
tive American Tribes from the conservation laws leaves the rest of
the population in the state open to poaching by Native Ameri-
cans.212 Even worse, it leaves the Chippewa open to outside influ-
ence.213 If someone offered the Tribe enough money, they may be
convinced to poach the land of its natural resources for the benefit
of another.21 4 This may start a "chain reaction" that disturbs the
delicate interdependency of the environment, and leads to the ulti-
mate destruction of the land in question. 21 5
In order to ensure the preservation of the environment, the
Supreme Court should acknowledge the concerns states face in
dealing with environmental issues. In so doing, the Court must put
power in the hands of state governments to regulate hunting and
fishing rights in order to protect the environment from disruption
of its delicate balance. Furthermore, placing the power in the
states' hands allows them to control the development of their own
land. States should have the power to regulate hunting and fishing
rights within their own lands because they have an urgent stake in
these concerns.
Joshua C. Quinter
211. Cf U.S. CONST. am. X. The power to control the environment was left to
the states under the Tenth Amendment. See id.
212. See Anderson, supra note 208, at IC. This is not to say that the Chippewa
Indians would take more than they needed to survive. See id. However, if that
possibility exists, the Indians may do it. See id.
213. See id. The btssumption that destruction of the environment could lead
to a concern that if the Indians would not do so unprompted, perhaps that result
would be achieved by outside influences wishing to take advantage of a loophole.
See id.
214. See Anderson, supra note 208, at IC (addressing concern that Indians
may be unduly influenced to damage environment). The State also had concerns
about "[t]he wealthiest people in our country" using the Indians, and a verdict for
the Chippewa puts them outside the reach of state natural resources agencies. See
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
215. See Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392,
395 (1968) (allocating state power to exercise police power over environment).
The Milk Lacs Court admitted that Indians have never been free of state environ-
mental regulation. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 222 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This
implies a recognition that the complete freedom of the Indians could possibly lead
to the destruction of the environment. See id.
20001
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